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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

* * * * * * * *
STATE OF UTAH,
Respondent,
vs.

Case No. 15568

WILLIE Ml1E WALKER, aka
DELL WALKER,
Appellant.

* * * * * * * * *
BRIEF OF APPELLANT

* * * * * * * * *
STATEHENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from a conviction for possession
of narcotics with the intent to distribute and a sentence
of fifteen years thereof.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks reversal of her conviction and
either the direction of a verdict of acquittal or a new
trial.
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STATEHENT OF FACTS
On the 14th day of July, 1976, police officers
obtained a search warrant to search for narcotics at the
premises of 511-513 West Second South, Salt Lake City, Utah
(R. 37).

The upstairs portion of that premises was a rooming

house or apartment complex which contains approximately
six apartments

(See State's Exhibit 1).

Several of the rooms

or apartments were occupied (Tr. 79, 100).

All of the apartmn

were searched by the police and narcotics were found in t\Vo oi
the rooms and on one person who was on the premises.

Three

arrests were made.
During the course of the search, 56 balloons of heroic.
were found in a night stand in Room 6 as appears on Exhibit 1 :
I

(Tr. 40-43).

The defendant in this case, the appellant herein!

is charged IVith possession with the intent to distribute
I

those 56 balloons of heroin.

The evidence \Vas clear that t~ I

room in IVhich the narcotics were found was not the bedroom
of the defendant (Tr. 53).

The room in which the narcotics

were found appeared to be a bedroom in which there was also
a desk containing business records from the restaurant
below (Tr. 53-54).

The defense witnesses testified that the

room was occupied by a man by the name of Hobert \vestley
(Tr. 165-166, 115).

The police testified that none of

1

Mr · Westley's clothes were found in the room, that the defenca·l
indicated that Westley was not staying in the room, and that
the defendant had control over the room (Tr. 80, 81, 82).
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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I

The defense preferred the testimony of Mr. James Housley
for the purpose of showing that Mr. Westley did, in fact,
occupy the room wherein the narcotics were found.

Mr. Housley

was a Salt Lake County Attorney at the time of the trial and
it was hoped that his testimony would be persuasive because
of the fact that he was a

lav~er

was working for the prosecution.

-- he was white -- and he
Mr. Housley, while in

private practice, had consulted with Robert Westley and had
observed him in that room in nightclothes getting out of bed.
However, the Court refused to allow his testimony on grounds
of foundation.
The jury convicted the defendant and she was sentenced
from one to fifteen years to the Utah State Prison.
POINT I
THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDEIJCE \HTH WHICH TO CONVICT
THE DEFEI\DANT OF THE CRIME OF POSSESSION OF NARCOTICS WITH
THE INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE.
The evidence in this case did not show the defendant's
guilt and, in fact, the defendant has consistantly maintained
her innocence.

As has been pointed out by legal scholars

and noted practitioners such as F. Lee Bailey, a claim of
innocence is the weakest claim that can be presented on appeal.
Mr. Bailey has stated that he would rather defend on appeal
a guilty person who was forced to confess or from whom
evidence was obtained illegally rather than an innocent
person whom the jury convicted.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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argument that can be presented on appeal is that there is
insufficient evidence for a jury to find a verdict of guilty,
However, in light of such knowledge and because the defendant
was innocent she will assert on appeal that there v1as insuffic 1
evidence on which to convict the appellant.
The defendant was not found in actual possession of
the narcotics.
the defendant

The narcotics were found in a room while
wa~

downstairs cooking in the restaurant.

The

prosecution ar;ued a theory of constructive possession i.e.,
that the de!'endant hc"d control over the room as she was the
proprietor of the premises and that the room contained
restaurant books and records and, therefore, she was in constructive possession of the narcotics.

The only evidence

brought before the Court was that the defendant was the proprietor of the premises; that the narcotics were found in a
room which was not the defendant's bedroom; that the room
in which the narcotics were found contained a bed and in a
separate part of the room a desk containing records from the
restaurant.

Beside the bed was a nightstand or commode in

which the heroin was found; the police officers testified
that the defendant stated that she had "control over the
room" or control over the entire premises.

That is the

entire evidence upon which the defendant was convicted.
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The defense proffered testimony that the room was
occupied by a Mr. Robert Westley.

During the search of the

premises, Mr. Westley was also searched (Tr. 96).

The search

of Mr. Westley uncovered four balloons of heroin on his person
(Tr. 100).

It was proven that the balloons that were taken

from the suspect Robert Westley were identical to the balloons
that were found in the room with which the defendant was
charged of possessing.
The prosecution's chemist testified that the heroin
with which the defendant was charged with possessing and which
was found in the room was cut with quinine.

He testified

that he was quite surprised to find quinine inasmuch as
quinine was primarily used as a cutting agent in the east
while in the west lactose was used to cut heroin (Tr. 107-108).
The evidence showed that Robert Westley was from Chicago.
The State's chemist also made an analysis of the
four balloons of heroin that were recovered from the search
of the person of Robert Westley.

In the balloons that were

recovered from the person of Robert Westley, quinine was also
found (Tr. 112).

Strangely enough, the balloons of heroin

with which the defendant was charged with possessing and were
found in the room were also cut with methapyrilene.

Again,

the prosecution's chemist testified that such was an uncommon
cutting agent (Tr. 109).

Coincidentally -- or not so co-

incidentally
-- the heroin found on Robert Westley was also
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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cut with methapyrilene (Tr. 112).

The State's chemist testi'.

that the chances of finding two samples on different persons
with the same amount of quinine and the same amount of
methapyrilene would be very small

(Tr. 109).

The defense called their own expert to reaffirm
these facts.

Kevin L. McCloskey a biochemical toxicologist

for the Center of Human Toxicology at the University of Utah
was called tc testi:':y on behalf of the defendant

(Tr. 151).

He examined both the heroin that the defendant was charged
with possessing which was found in the room and the heroin
found in the possession of Robert Westley.

He performed

quantitative analysis of the two heroin and found that
there were no physical dissimilarities
Also Ladislav Kopjak, who was a

(Tr. 153-154).

fore~sic

toxicologist for

the Center of Human Toxicology at the University of Utah was
called by the defense.

A forensic toxicologist analyzes

specimens for presence or absence of drugs or other toxic
substances (Tr. 155).

He analyzed both the specimens with

which the defendant was charged with possessing which were
found in the room and the specimens that were found in the
search of Robert Westley.

He testified:

"I found that quantitatively the samples seemed
to be similar and there was heroin, quinine,
and the antihistamine methapyrilene in the balloons
from 3-P and also 7-D.
(Tr. 158) . . . .
They both appeared to be similar quantitatively."
His report was introduced into evidence as Exhibit 11-D.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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was normally used as a cutting agent in the eastern United
States and not the western area (Tr. 158).
The prosecution -- not the defense -- elicited
evidence from the defense witness on cross examination
concerning the defendant's good character and lack of contact
with narcotics.

The defense witness Edward Barton who was

a former police officer and presently an investigator for the
Salt Lake Legal Defenders' Association, testified pursuant to
questions asked by the prosecution on cross-examination as
follows:

Q.

Do you know Willie Mae Walker that well?

A.

Yes, I have known her for some time.

Q.

Have you, have you ever known her to be a
user of narcotic drugs.

A.

No sir, I have not.

Q.

How long have you known her?

A.

Probably five years.

(Tr. 150).

Also the defense witness, James Frank Housley, a prosecutor
for the Salt Lake County Attorney's Office was cross-examined
by the prosecution:

Q.

How did you characterize your relationship with
the defendant.

A.

I -- I was her lawyer for three and one half
or four years and considered myself to be a
good friend and her to be a good friend to
me.
(Tr. 136).

It is the defendant's contention that there can be
S.J. Quinney Law Library.
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in the room -- the narcotics that the defendant was convicted
of possessing -- was from the same source as the narcotics
in the possession of Robert Westley.

It is further the

defendant's position that in view of Robert Westley's

occupan~

of or at least access to the room in which the narcotics were
found and the fact that the defendant may also have access
to that room is insufficient evidence on which to convict her
of possession of heroin.
The defense moved for a directed verdict:
MR. LEEDY: The defense moves for a directed verdict
of acquittal on the grounds and for the reason
that there is insufficient evidence from which
this jury could reasonably determine that the
heroin contained in Exhibit 3P was possessed
and belonged to the defendant Willie Mae
Walker.
(Tr. 221)
A statement of the law and a summarization of the
pertinent cases is found in Mulligan v. State and Richardson v. I
State, 513 P. 2d 180 (1973), in that case marijuana was found
in an apartment to which two persons had access.

One of the

persons was found guilty of possession and the Wyoming Supreme
Court reversed.

In so doing, it stated:

As to circumstantial evidence in a criminal case,
we said in State v. RidGout, (I·Jyo.) 450 P. 2d
452 , 454, 455, evidence creating a mere probability
of guilt is not sufficient; much less is evidence
which gives rise to mere suspicious or conjecture
of guilt .
.If the circumstances, no matter
how strong, can be reasonably reconciled with a
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theory that some other person may have done the act,
of the defendant should not be convicted and a verdict
of guilty should be set aside as contrary to law.
Gardner v. State, 27 Wyo. 316, 196 Pac. 750, 751;
Thompson v. State, 41 Wyo, 72, 283 Pac. 151, 157.
In State v. Haynes, 25 Ohio St. 2d 264, 267 N.E.
2d 787, 788, the Court held that where the only
evidence of possession was the police discovery
of the narcotics in the general living area of
the apartmP.nt occupied by defendant and four others,
such evidence was not sufficient to convict for
possession.
In Sturgeon v. State, Okl. Cr. 483 P. 2d 335, 338,
it was held; where an unlawful drug is found in
premises not occupied exclusively by the defendant,
and nothing more is shown, the evidence is circumstantial and insufficient. . . . Convictivn
was reversed in Thompson v. United States, D.C.C.A.
293 A. 2d 275, 276, when the court commenting,
someone in the apartment was in possession, actual
or constructive, of the marijuana; but the evidence
failed to make a showing beyond a reasonable doubt
that appellant was that person.
In narcotic cases there is respectable authority
for the proposition that if a person has control
of premises on which the drugs are found, there
is a presumption that he was in possession of
the drugs.
On the other hand, if possession is
not sho~m to be exclusive, there must be. other
evidence to warrant such inference. One of the
leading cases for this proposition is People v.
Antista, 129 Cal. App. 2d 47, 276 P. 2d 17~,-r79
• • . A more recent case and one which like in
Antista, is frequently cited is Brown v. State,
Okl. Cr. 481 P. 2d 475, 477-478.
It stands for
the proposition that it cannot be inferred for
merely being present in a place where marijuana is
found the defendant had knowledge of its presence
and had dominion and control. Citing from Antista,
that court considered it neither for the State to
prove either that the marijuana belonged to the
defendant or that it had been left in his care
by someone else.
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The Brown court also referred to Petty v. People,
167 co~o. 240, 447 P. 2d 217, 220, where the
defendant's conviction for possession of marijuana
found in an apartment shared with another was reversed for insufficiency.

The rule to be derived in connection with an inferenc'
of possession of narcotics from possession of premis~
is well stated in Felts v. People, Colo. 498 P. 2d
1128, 1131, in these words:
"· . . where a person in in possession but not
in exclusive possession of that premises, it
may not be inferred that he knew of the presence
of marijuana there and had control of that
unless there are statements or other circumstances
tending to buttress the inference" . .
In the present case the evidence shows that Robert
Westley had, at least access if not total occupancy, to the
room where the 56 balloons of heroin were found.

Under law

as stated above, there will be insufficient evidence to convict
the appellant for possession of heroin found in that room
unless there was other evidence indicating that the heroin
was hers.

There was no such other evidence.
POINT II

THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO ALLO\v TESTIMONY FROM
THE WITNESS JAf.!ES HOUSLEY THAT ROBERT IVESTLEY OCCUPIED THE
ROOH IN I'IHICH THE NARCOTICS WERE FOUND.
During the prosecution's case, the police officers
attempted to imply that Robert Westley did not occupy the
room in which the narcotics were found.

This was done by

virtue of testimony to the effect that no articles of men's
clothing
were
in for
the
room
(Tr.
87).
AndServices
also,
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by so-called "admissions" of the defendant herself that she

had control of the room (Tr. 82-83).

The defense preferred

evidence that Westley did, in fact occupy the room in which
the narcotics were found.
of the defendant herself

This was done through the testimony
(Tr. 165-172), and also another occupant

of the apartment house, a Mr. Chalmers Hood (Tr. 115).

The

defense desired to support their testimony with the testimony
of Mr. James Housley, who was a white, a lawyer, and a
then prosecuting attorney.

The prosecution attempted to

prevent such evidence, first by a "motion in liminie"

(R. 76-77),

and then objections during the course of the examination.
The defense strongly excepted to the prosecution's
attempt to cover up that evidence as well as their removal
of certain evidence from the courtroom during the trial.
In a motion for a directed verdict the defense counsel stated:
"I think it raises a Brady v. Maryland problem.
I think this has been the case from the start.
I believe it was well within the prosecution's
knowledge that the room marked "0" was, in fact,
Robert Westley's room.
One of the prosecutors
visited Mr. Westley in that rarticular room. Not
only did they not disclose that to me, now I understand they are going to argue maybe it was at a
different time.
Now they have taken the dope out.
The prosecution responded that a Brady v. Maryland was not
proper in that no demand was made for exculpatory evidence (Tr. 60).
The court reprimanded the prosecution, but denied the defendant's
motion.
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"Well, the problem with it, Mr. Austin, is that
when items come into evidence via the preliminary
hearing stage, or at the trial stage, those are
within the jurisdiction of the Court, and they ar~
not to be removed.
When I say not to be removed, "they are not to
be removed without a Court order."
In attempting to elicit the testimony from the wi tnes:
James Housley, that he had seen Mr. Robert Westley occupy the
room in which the narcotics were found,

the following

occurr~:

Q.

And did you have occasion to rep~esent Mr.
Robert Westley, or a male person known as
"Billie 11 ?

A.

I had the man known to me as "Billie" consult
with me and I charged him a fee.
I didn't
repre5ent him any more than just a short
consultation.

Q.

Now, with respect to that confrontation, did
you have occasion to visit with him in his
room above Dell's Cafe?

MR. AUSTIN:
Objection at this point, I believe Lhat
comes under the attorney-client privilege and
Mr. Westley is not here to claim the privilege.

THE COURT:
Just a minute.
is overruled.

Excuse me.

The obj ectio"
1

A.

I didn't visit in his room, and it wasn't in
connection with my representation of him, but
I have seen tim there.

Q.

You have seen Mr. Westley in his room before at
Dell's Cafe?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Would you describe for the jury which room
that was?

MR. AUSTIN:

Objection, foundation.
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Q.

I'll ask you to look at Exhibit 9D and ask if
you can recognize what that is a diagram of?

A.

I recognize it as a diagram of the second floor
of what I know as Dell's Cafe on West Second South.

Q.

And are you familiar with Dell's room on Exhibit 9D?

A.

Yes.

Q.

During the period of time of July -- that is when
this search was -- July of 1976, are you aware
of which room was hers?

A.

Yes.

Q.

Which room would it have been?

A.

This room right here.

Q.

Now, you indicated also that you had occasion to
visit Mr. Westley on Exhibit -- or excuse me,
in the upstairs area of Dell's Cafe, is that
correct?

A.

Yes.
I don't think I had occasion to visit
with him there, I saw him there.

Q.

You did see him in his room?

A.

I saw him in a room that I thought was his room.

Q.

Which room?

(Tr. 130-131).

MR. AUSTIN: Objection to what he thinks, your Honor,
only to what he knows.

Q.

Why did you think the room you saw him in was
his room?

A.

Well, he was getting out of bed, he was undressed
getting out of bed.

Q.

Okay, what room was that you observed him in?

MR. AUSTIN:

Objection, foundation, time period.
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MR. LEEDY:

Do you recall when this occasion was?

A.

Not precisely.

Q.

Could you give me your best recollection?

A.

I knew the man that I knew as "Billie" from late
December of 1975 until sometime in the summer
of 1976, and I can't tell you the date.
I know
it was prior to the time that Dell was arrested
on this charge.

Q.

Now, would you point out for the jury what room
it was that you observed Mr. Westley getting out
of bed in, partially clad?

MR. AUSTIN: Objection to that, your Honor, it would
be irrelevant, no foundation as to period of
time.
THE COURT:

The objection will be sustained.

MR. LEEDY:

May I make a proffer.

THE COURT:

You may, outside the presence of the jury.

MR. LEEDY:

Should we approach the bench?

Unfortunately, the proffer was not recorded by the
Court reporter, but it has been submitted in the record.
The proffer was that sometime prior to the search, but after
December of 1975, Mr. Housley had seen Mr. Westley in the rooo
in which the narcotics were found and that .Mr. Westley was just
getting out of bed and was partially clad.
It is the defendant's position that such evidence was
relevant and a foundation had been laid.

The fact that the

observation was not made at the precise time of the search
may go to the weight of the evidence, but would certainly not
go to its relevancy, nor foundation.
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The foundational objection was obviously not well taken
as the witness had testified as to his personal knowledge
concerning the events about which he was to be examined.
The relevancy objection was likewise improper.
Relevant evidence is all competent evidence of facts and
circumstances which afford reasonable inferences or throw
light upon the matter or matters contested, 29 Am. Jur. 2d
299, Evidence, §251.
One of the extremely relevant issues in the lawsuit
was whether or not Robert Westley had access to or occupied
the room in which the

~eroin

was found.

His occupancy of that

room at some time prior to the search would certainly be
relevant inasmuch as a reasonable juror could infer present
occupancy from prior occupancy.

The fact that evidence

"Is remote in point of time . . . does not of
itself preclude its admissability. . . .
In
effect, the objection of the evidence is too
remote goes to the credibility of the evidence
rather than to its admissability, unless the
remoteness is so great that the proffer of
evidence has no probative value at all."
Thus, the sustaining of the objection on grounds of
relevancy and foundation to the witness Housley's testimony
was improper and in error.

The exclusion of such testimony

was prejudicial in that it would have supported the defendant's
position; that Robert Westley had access to the room and,
thus, the defendant should not have been convicted for possession
based upon the sole evidence that narcotics were found in the
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same room.

POINT III
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO GIVE THE DEFENDANT'S
REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. l AllD NO. 3 CONCERNING ACCESS TO
OR EXCLUSIVE CONTROL OF A ROON l/HERE NARCOTICS ARE FOUND.
The defendant requested that the District Court instr_
the jury as follows:
Instruction No. l. 11embers of the jury, you are
instructed that the defendant Willie Mae Walker
is charged with the crime of possession of
heroin with the intent to distribute.
Before
the defendant may be found guilty of this offense,
it is incumbent upon the prosecution to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had
possession o~ heroin.
The law recognizes two kinds of possession, actual
possession and constructive possession.
Before
a person can be said to have actual possession,
a person must knowingly have direct control over
the substance of the time alleged, and in this
case, with the required intent to distribute. A
person may be in constructive possession with the
intent to distribute rather than actual possession
when a person knowingly and with specific intent
to distribut has the power and intention at the
time alleged to exercise dominion and control over
the substance. A person is neither in control nor
in actual possession nor in constructive possession
unless they have actual power themselves to exercise
dominion over the substance.
The mere fact that a person had access to premises
or may be the legal owner or landlady of the
premises where a substance is located does not
establish that the person was in actual or constructive possession of the substance on such
premises.
Rather, the prosecution must establish
control or dominion over the substance and, in
this case, with the intent to distribute (R 92).
The defendant also requested the Court to instruct
the jury:
Instruction No. 3.

Members of the jury, you are

that forthe
prosecution
has
the and
burden
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balloons of heroin introduced in this case belong
to or were possessed by the defendant Willie Mae
Walker.
The mere fact that Willie Mae Walker may
have had access to the room where the heroin was
found is insufficient evidence to prove that she
had possession or control of the substance found
therein.
The court refused to give those instructions (R. 90-92).
The defendant excepted at

(R 221).

MR. LEEDY:
The defense will except to the Court's
failure to give the proposed Instruction No. 3
concerning access to the room, and believes that
the general instructions regarding possession and
control are insufficient and would confuse the
jury.
For the same reasons and rationale, in the cases
stated under Point I, it was error for the Court to fail to
give the defendant's proposed jury instructions.

If more than

one person has access to a room in which narcotics are found
for a conviction to be sustained, there must be more evidence
of possession by one than simply that the narcotics were found
in the room.

Further, if nothing more is shown than the fact

that an unlawful drug is found on the premises not occupied
exclusively by the defendant, then an acquittal should be had.
That was the import of Instruction No. 1 and 3, and in no
other place did the Court properly instruct a jury as to the
law where more than one person had access to a room wherein
narcotics were found.

For this reason, the conviction should

be reversed and a new trial granted with instructions to give
the proper jury instruction regarding joint access to a room.
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POINT IV
THE COURT SHOULD REVERSE THE CONVICTION AS THE
EVIDENCE WHICH \•!AS INTRODUCED AGAINST THE DEFENDANT 1'/J,S
SEIZED ILLEGALLY.
As pointed out in the Statement of Fact, the seizure
of the evidence in this case took place pursuant to a search
warrant.

The search warrant directed a search of the entire

premises at 511-513 \Vest Second South.

The cafe, the several

different apartments occupied by different people and differen:
persons.

The

se~rc~

the descriptlon

o~

warrant is overly broad with respect to

the place and persons to be searched.

The

Court may recall that the Fourth Amendment requires that the
place to be searched be described with particularity as well
as the things to be seized or searched for.

The search

warrant in this case describes the business establishements,
a cafe and apartment house, containing several apartments,
at two addresses involving several tenants.

The law regarding i

the search of hotels or apartments was laid down in U.S. v.
Hinton, 219 F. 2d 324 (C.A. 7, 1955).

In that case the

Court stated at page 325:
The showing of probable cause and the particularity
of the description of the place to be searched are
usually treated separately, but in view of the
many problems presented bv this appeal, they must
be considered together, f~r the scope of the warrant
to search is dependent uoon the extent of the
showing of probable caus~.
The command to search
can never include more than is covered by showing
of probable cause to search.
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In this case, one Jane Wilson signed an affidavit
stating that on the date previous, she had seen
heroin being sold in the premises . .
(These are the precise facts that are shown in the
affidavit in support of the search warrant in the present
case.)
The affidavit failed to identify the particular
apartment or apartments in which the sales were
made and it did not allege the sales were made in
apartments occupied by any of the alleged
sellers.
(Again, these are the precise facts of the affidavit in the
instant case.)
On the basis of these meager factual allegations
in the affidavit, the government commissioner issued
a warrant commanding the search of the entire
building.
The add~ess named in the warrant
is an entire apartment building.
For purposes of satisfying the Fourth Amendment
searching two or more apartments in the same building
is no different than searching two or more completely
separate houses.
Probable cause must be shown
for searching each house or, in this case, each
apartment.
If such cause is shown, there is no
reason for requiring separate warrants for each
resident. A single warrant may cover several
different places or residences in a single building.
But probable cause must be shown for searching each
residence unless it be shown that although appearing
to be a building of several apartments, the entire
building is actually being used as a single unit.
Federal Courts have consistently held that the
Fourth Amendment requirement that a specific "place"
be described when applied to dwellings referred to
as a single living unit, (the residence of one
person or family).
Thus, a warrant which describes
an entire building when cause is shown for searching
only one apartment is void.
United States v.
Barkous\as, D.C. 38 F. 2d 837; United States v.
DianC1e-:-o.-c. 32 F. Supp. 944; United States v.
Chin On, D.C. 297 F. 531; United States v. Innelli,
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D.C. 286 F. 731, United States v. Mitchell, D.C.
274 F. 128.
The basic requirement is that the
officers who are commanded to search be able from
the "particular" description of the search warrant
to identify the specific place for which there is
probable cause to ~elieve that a crime has been
committed.
This requirement may be satisfied by
giving the address of the building and naming
the person whose apartment is to be searched.
(Citations omitted).
But the warrant here cannot
be saved by the limiting effect of naming the
persons whose residence are to be searched
because it expressly commands the search of the
entire building ..
The validity of the warrant depends upon the
shov.•ing made before the commissioner at the time
of its issuance.
(Citations omitted).
It may well
be that the affidavits show probable cause to
search the residences of the four women referred
to, provided they would be accurately identified
from the alias given.
But the affidavit does not
establish probable cause to search the entire buildim'
without the allegations of facts to show that each
of the apartments in the buildings was the residence of at least one of the persons alleged in
the affidavit to have been seen selling the narcotics.
If the officers had found that the defendants
were the only ones living in the apartment buildins
and that no innocent persons had actually suffered
an unjustified search, the warrant would still
be invalid.
The validity of the warrant is
dependent on the facts shown in the affidavit
before the issuing authority.
We are not being overly technical in this.
We
are merely insisting as we must, that in issuing
search warrants the requirement of the Fourth
Amendment be met.
If innocent persons were
actually subjected to an un"ust search under
the warrant in question, he~e, as might well be
the case, it would still be argued that the defendants were not harmed thereby and, thus, should
not be able to challenge the warrant because its
coverage was too broad. The cases already cited
make it clear that this argument has not been
accepted by the courts because they are determined
to discourage the practice of issuing warrants
without a sufficient showing of cause or, as in
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The record in this case does show that several people
were living in the apartment portion of 511-513 West Second
South (R. 164-167).
The rule as established in Hinton is also relied
on in state cases.

People v. Franks, 221 N.W. 2d 441, relying

u.s.

on Lyman v. United States, 297 F. 177, Cert. Den., 266
604.

The above test s&tisfies the general rule behind the
prohibition of the rourth Amendment requiring the description
of places with particularty which is that the adequacy of
the description of a search warrant is determined by whether
or not given specificity of the warrant, violation of personal
rights is likely, either through a general search directed
toward intended persons or a search incorrectly directed
toward different and presumptively innocent persons.

U.S. v.

Bynam, 386 F. Supp. 449, affd. 573 F. 2d 533.
It is the defendant's position that the search warrant
was so general as to allow the search of various tenants'
apartments for which no probable cause was shown in the
affidavit supporting the search warrant is so general as
to be defective, nor does such a search warrant comply with
the rules laid down in the cases above mentioned.
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The warrant itself also commanded the search of
persons for which no probable cause was shown.

The search

warrant commanded the search of a "male person known only a
'Billie'".

In fact,

the affidavit in support of the search

warrant no where mentions the name "Billy" except as a person
to be searched.
There is no question that the search warrant was
overly broad ana commanded the search of places and persons
for which no probable cause was shown.
POINT V
THE COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING INTO EVIDENCE EXHIBIT
5 WHICH 1'/AS T\'10 ENVELOPES ADDRESSED TO \'liLLIE 1'/ALKER, 511
WEST SECO~D SOUTH, AND THE SEIZURE OF SUCH EVIDENCE FROM THE
SEARCH OI' THE PREMISES, WAS ILLEGAL AND OUTSIDE THE SCOPE
OF THE WARRANT.
The search warrant in this case permitted and commandeci
the search for narcotics.

The search warrant mentioned

nothing about any envelope containing the name of the defendant
which might subsequently be used as evidence.
seizure of the envelopes was

Thus, the

not within the direction or

confines of the search warrant; nor could a search warrant
for the seizure of envelopes be issued.
Section 77-54-2, Utah Code Ann. 1953, provides
the grounds for the issuance of a search warrant
and allows the seizure of property
(i) When stolen or embezzled;
(ii)
(iii)

When it was used as a means for committing
a felony;
When it is in the possession of a person
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Utah statute does not allow a search for "mere
evidence.

The envelopes being "mere evidence" and were not

within the mandate of the search warrant and should have been
suppressed and the introduction thereof into evidence was in
error.
CONCLUSION
In summary,
There was insufficient evidence upon which to convict
the defendant inasmuch as the only evidence of possession that
narcotics were found in a room to which the defendant had
access as others also had access.
The Court erred in refusing to allow the testimony
of the witness James Housley to the effect that he had seen
Robert Nestley occupying the room in which the narcotics were
found prior to the search; the refusal to allow such testimony
was prejudicial inasmuch as access to the room was a key
issue in the case and Housley would have been an important
witness to the defendant as he was the only white witness
who obviously had no reason to lie or be untruthful.
The Court erred in refusing to give the defendant's
proposed instructions which provided that if more than one
person had access to a room in which narcotics were found, then
the prosecution must

prove more than mere presence of a nar-

cotic in order to convict the defendant of possession.
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The search warrant in the instant case was overly
broad and commanded the search of apartments and persons for
which no probable cause was shown and such invalidates the
entire search -- probable cause must be shown for the search
of each apartment in an apartment building and the fact that
there is probable cause to believe that narcotics may be
present in some part of the apartment building does not justif)
a search warrant commanding the search of the entire building.
The seizure of the two envelopes was beyond the
scope of

th~

~arrant

and constituted mere evidence and the

introduction thereof was improper and in error.
DATED this
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